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Abstract
Various research initiatives try to utilize the operational principles of organisms and
brains to develop alternative, biologically inspired computing paradigms and arti-
ficial cognitive systems. This paper reviews key features of the standard method
applied to complexity in the cognitive and brain sciences, i.e. decompositional
analysis or reverse engineering. The indisputable complexity of brain and mind
raise the issue of whether they can be understood by applying the standard method.
Actually, recent findings in the experimental and theoretical fields, question central
assumptions and hypotheses made for reverse engineering.
Using the modeling relation as analyzed by Robert Rosen, the scientific analysis
method itself is made a subject of discussion. It is concluded that the fundamental
assumption of cognitive science, i.e. complex cognitive systems can be analyzed,
understood and duplicated by reverse engineering, must be abandoned. Implica-
tions for investigations of organisms and behavior as well as for engineering artifi-
cial cognitive systems are discussed.
1 Introduction
For some time past, computer science and engineering devote close attention to
the functioning of the brain. It has been argued that recent advances in cognitive
science and neuroscience have enabled a rich scientific understanding of how cog-
nition works in the human brain. Thus, research programs have been initiated by
leading research organizations to build new computing systems based on informa-
tion processing principles derived from the working of the brain, and to develop
new cognitive architectures and computational models of human cognition (see,
e.g. [1, 2], and references therein).
Two points are emphasized in those research programs: First, there is impres-
sive abundance of available experimental brain data, and second, we have the com-
puting power to meet the enormous requirements to simulate a complex system like
the brain. Given the improved scientific understanding of the operational principles
of the brain as a complexly organized system, it should then be possible to build an
operational, quantitative model of the brain. Tuning the model could be achieved
then using the deluge of empirical data, due to the ever-improving experimental
techniques of neuroscience.
Trying to put this idea into practice, however, has generally produced disen-
chantment after high initial hopes and hype. If we rhetorically pose the question
“What is going wrong?” (as previously posed in the field of robotics [3]), possible
answers are: (1) The parameters of our models are wrong; (2) We are below some
complexity threshold; (3) We lack computing power; (4) We are missing some-
thing fundamental and unimagined. In most cases, only answers (1)-(3) are con-
sidered by computer and AI scientists, and allied neuroscientists, and conclusions
are drawn in similar vein. If answer (1) is considered true, still better experimental
methodologies are demanded to gather the right data, preferably at the molecular
genetic level (e.g. [4]). Answers (2) and (3) often induce claims for concerted, in-
tensified efforts relating phenomena and data at many levels of brain organization
(e.g. [5]).
Together, any of answers (1)-(3) would mean that there is nothing in principle
that we do not understand about brain organization. All the concepts and com-
ponents are present, and need only to be put into the model. This view is widely
taken; it represents the belief in the efficiency of the scientific method, and it leads
one to assume that our understanding of the brain will major advance as soon as
the ‘obstacles’ are cleared away.
As I will show in this paper, there is, however, substantial evidence in favour
of answer (4). I will argue that, by following the standard scientific method, we
are in fact ignoring something fundamental, namely that biological and engineered
systems are basically different in nature.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents conceptual and method-
ological basics of the cognitive and brain sciences. The concepts of decompo-
sitional analysis and localization underlying the reverse engineering method are
reviewed. I discuss the idea of modularization and its relation to the superposition
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principle of system theory. Then, Section 3 shortly touches on Blue Brain and
SyNAPSE, two leading reverse-engineering projects. Both projects are based on
the hypothesis of the columnar organization of the cortex. The rationale underly-
ing reverse engineering in cognitive and brain sciences is outlined. New findings
are mentioned questioning the concept of the basic uniformity of the cortex, and
consequences for the reverse-engineering projects are discussed. Section 4 ponders
about the claim that non-decomposability is not an intrinsic property of complex
systems but is only in our eyes, due to insufficient mathematical techniques. For
this, the modeling relation as analyzed by Robert Rosen is explained which enables
us to make the scientific analysis method itself a subject of discussion. It is con-
cluded that the fundamental assumption of cognitive science must be abandoned. I
end the paper by some conclusions for the study of organisms and behavior as well
as for engineering artificial cognitive systems.
2 Methodological Basics
2.1 Decomposability
Brains, even those of simple animals, are enormously complex structures, and it
is a very ambitious goal to cope with this complexity. The scientific disciplines
involved in cognitive and brain research are committed to a common methodology
to explain the properties and capacities of complex systems. It is decompositional
analysis, i.e. analysis of the system in terms of its components or subsystems.
Since Simon’s influential book “The Sciences of the Artificial” [12], (near-)
decomposability of complex systems has been accepted as fundamental for the
cognitive and brain sciences. Cognitive capacities are considered as dispositional
properties which can be explained via decompositional analysis. I call this the fun-
damental assumption for the cognitive and brain sciences. Simon [12], Wimsatt
[13] and Bechtel and Richardson [14], among others, have further elaborated this
concept. They consider decomposability a continously varying system property,
and state, roughly, that systems fall on a continuum from aggregate (full decom-
posable) to integrated (non-decomposable) (Fig. 1). The fundamental assumption
implies that cognitive and brain systems are non-ideal aggregate systems; the ca-
pacities of the components are internally realized by strong intra-component inter-
actions, and interactions between components do not appreciably contribute to the
capacities; they are much weaker than the intra-component interactions. Hence, the
description of the complex system as a set of weakly interacting components seems
to be a good approximation. This property of complex systems, which should have
evolved through natural selection, was called near-decomposability [12].
Simon characterizes near-decomposability as follows: (1) In a nearly decom-
posable system, the short-run behaviour of each of the component subsystems is
approximately independent of the short-run behaviour of the other components;
(2) in the long run the behaviour of any one of the components depends in only
an aggregate way on the behaviour of the other components [12, p.100]. Thus,
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Figure 1: Decomposability as a continously varying system property. According
to this view, the focus is on near-decomposable systems which would represent the
most relevant systems category in the cognitive and brain sciences.
if the capacities of a near-decomposable system are to be explained, to some ap-
proximation its components can be studied in isolation, and based on their known
interactions, their capacities eventually combined to generate the systems behavior.
Let us summarize this assumption because it is of central importance in the
following:
Fundamental assumption for cognitive and brain sciences.
Cognitive and brain systems are non-ideal aggregate systems. The ca-
pacities of the components are internally realized (strong intra-component
interactions) while interactions between components are negligible
with respect to capacities. Any capacity of the whole system then
results from superposition of the capacities of its subsystems. This
property of cognitive and brain systems should have evolved through
natural selection and is called near-decomposability.
2.2 Decompositional Analysis
The primary goal of cognitive science and its subdisciplines is to understand cog-
nitive capacities like vision, language, memory, planning etc. That is, we want to
answer questions of the form ”does system S possess or exercise a capacity C?”.
The quest for S’s capacity C can be replaced by evaluating the proposition P(S) =
”S possesses or exercises the capacity C”. In other words, we want to determine
the truth or falsity of the proposition P(S).
Cummins [15, 16] suggests that a system’s capacity can be explained by a
functional analysis of that capacity. A functional analysis of some capacity C pro-
ceeds, roughly, by parsing the capacity into a set of constituent sub–capacities
C1,C2, ...,Cn. Note that the sequence has to be specified in which those constituent
capacities must be exercised for producing the complex capacity. That is, there is
an algorithm which can be programmed to decide whether system S has C or P, by
processing a finite list of propositions P1,P2, ...,Pn.
The scheme then asserts that any capacity proposition P(S) can be expressed
as conjunction of a finite number of sub-propositions Pi(S) the truth of each one
is necessary, and all together sufficient, for P(S) to be true1. Hence, a functional
1Cummin’s scheme evidently employs Frege’s principle of compositionality, well-known in
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analysis comprises the following steps:
Functional analysis.
1. Establish that system S has capacity C or property P.
2. Decompose P into sub-properties P1(S), P2(S),..., Pn(S).
3. Specify the sequence in which the sub-properties Pi are to be processed to
generate P, i.e. the algorithm.
Then it follows that P(S) =
∧n
i=1 Pi(S). (1)
If this scheme is applied to a material system S with the property P(S), it allows
to express P(S) in the form of eqn. (1), i.e. by purely syntactical means. That is,
property P(S) is redundant, and its truth does not provide new information about
system S, cf. [11].
A cognitive capacity may be explained not only by analyzing the capacity itself,
but also by analyzing the system that has it. This type of decompositional analysis
is structural analysis [17, 18]. It involves to attempt to identify the structural, ma-
terial components of the system. Thus, the material system S is to be decomposed
into context-independent components S j, i.e. their individual properties Pk(S j) are
independent of the decomposition process itself and of S’s environment.
2.3 Localization
Functional analysis and structural analysis must be clearly differentiated, although
in practice, there is a close interplay between them (as indicated by the double
arrow in Fig. 2). This is obvious in the localization approach which combines both
analysis types. The essential assumption is that each of the sub-properties Pi(S),
into which the property P(S) was decomposed, is to be localized in some particular
subsystem S j of S itself. Thus, the properties Pk(S j) of S’s material components S j
equal exactly the conjunction terms in eqn. (1), i.e. for each sub-property Pi(S)
there is a structural component S j whose property Pk(S j) is identical to Pi(S),
Pi(S) = Pk(S j). (2)
Thus, eqn.(1) can be rewritten as
computer science as ‘divide and conquer’.
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Figure 2: View on decompositional analysis of brain and cognition. See text for
details.
P(S) =
∧
j,k
Pk(S j). (3)
Equation (2) in a nutshell expresses the idea of the fundamental assumption,
i.e. decomposition and localization. Properties Pi(S) of the whole system S are
identified with properties Pk(S j) of certain of its subsystems S j. This means, one
assumes that any material system S (including brain) can be decomposed into
context-independent parts or structural components S j in such a way that their
properties Pk(S j) are independent of the properties of the other parts and of any
environment. Thus, a set of decomposition operators Di on S of the form
Di(S) = Si (4)
is supposed which isolate the subsystems Si from S. Corresponding to the
fundamental assumption, the operators Di break the inter–component interactions
which ‘glue’ the context-independent components of S together, but without affect-
ing any of the intra-component interactions.
Ideally, decomposition operations like Di are reversible, i.e. the whole system
S can be synthesized from the components S j,
S = S1 ⊗S2 ⊗ ...⊗Sm, (5)
where the ⊗-symbol denotes inter–component interactions like those broken
by the decomposition operators Di. Thus, S is to be considered as a kind of direct
product. Now the close analogy of expressions (3) and (5) becomes obvious: the
fractionation of system S corresponds to the compositionality of property P(S)
while the connector symbol ∧ replaces the inter–component interaction symbol ⊗,
P(S) = P1(S1)∧P2(S2)∧ ...∧Pm(Sm). (6)
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These suppositions allow to proceed wholly in the syntactical realm. Any prop-
erty P of a physical system S comes with an algorithm for evaluating P’s truth, and
any physical system S can be algorithmically generated from a sufficiently large
population of components Si by exclusively syntactical means. In both cases, anal-
ysis and synthesis are inverse operations which are realized entirely by algorithms,
i.e. the operations are computable, cf. [11, p. 131].
Understating the case, the localization approach has been described as hypo-
thetical identification which is to serve as research heuristics [14]. In fact, however,
the majority of cognitive scientists considers it as fundamental and indispensable
(e.g. [18, 23]). For example, Von Eckardt [18] points out that a functional analysis
for a capacity C only provides us with a possible explanation of how the system
has capacity C. That is because the decomposition of a composed capacity is not
unique - it can be parsed into various alternative sequences of constituent capaci-
ties, each of which is sufficient for S’s capacity C. As a way out, she suggests to
build a model that is structurally adequate by employing the localization approach.
A caveat is necessary, however: There is no reason to assume that functional
and structural components match up one-to-one! Of course, it might be the case
that some functional components map properly onto individual structural compo-
nents. It is rather probable, however, for a certain functional component to be
implemented by non-localized, spatially distributed material components. Con-
versely, a given structural component may implement more than one distinct func-
tion. According to Dennett [19, p. 273]: “In a system as complex as the brain, there
is likely to be much ‘multiple, superimposed functionality’.” With other words, we
cannot expect specific functions to be mapped to structurally bounded neuronal
structures, and vice versa. It is now well known that Dennett’s caveat has been
proved as justified (e.g. [20]). Thus the value of the localization approach as ‘re-
search heuristics’ seems rather dubious [21, 22].
2.4 Linearity, Modularization and Complex Systems
In the cognitive and brain sciences, as in other fields of science, the components
of near-decomposable systems are called modules. This term originates from en-
gineering; it denotes the process of decomposing a product into building blocks -
modules - with specified interfaces, driven by the designer’s interests and intended
functions of the product. It refers either to functional or structural components.
Modularized systems are linear in the sense that they obey an analog of the su-
perposition principle of linear system theory in engineering [24]. If the modules
are structurally localized functional components, the superposition principle is ex-
pressed by eqn. (5). The function of a decomposable system results from the linear
combination of the functions of the system modules2. This principle mirrors the
constructive step in the scheme of reverse engineering (see above and Section 3
2A corresponding class of models in mathematics is characterized by the superposition theorem
for homogeneous linear differential equations stating that the sum of any two solutions is itself a
solution.
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below). The terms ‘linear’ and ‘nonlinear’ are often used in this way: ‘Linear’
systems are decomposable into independent modules with linear, proportional in-
teractions while ‘nonlinear’ systems are not3 [24, 25].
Applying this concept to the systems at the other end of the complexity scale
(Fig. 1), the integrated systems are basically not decomposable, due to the strong,
nonlinear interactions involved. Thus, past or present states or actions of any or
most subsystems always affect the state or action of any or most other subsystems.
In practice, analyses of integrated systems nevertheless try to apply the methodol-
ogy for decomposable systems, in particular if there is some hope that the inter-
actions can be linearized. Such linearizable systems have been above denoted as
nearly decomposable. However, in the case of strong nonlinear interactions, we
must accept that decompositional analysis is not applicable.
Already several decades ago this insight was stressed. For example, Levins
[26, p.76 ff.] around 1970 proposed a classification of systems into aggregate,
composed and evolved systems. While the aggregate and the composed would
not cause serious problems for decompositional analyses, Levins emphasized the
special character of evolved systems:
A third kind of system no longer permits this kind of analysis. This
is a system in which the component subsystems have evolved together,
and are not even obviously separable; in which it may be conceptu-
ally difficult to decide what are the really relevant component subsys-
tems.... The decomposition of a complex system into subsystems can be
done in many ways... it is no longer obvious what the proper subsys-
tems are, but these may be processes, or physical subsets, or entities
of a different kind.
This statement clearly contradicts the fundamental assumption, and it has not
lost its relevance, as the findings of complexity science have shown. Nevertheless,
most researchers in the cognitive and brain sciences found reasons to cling to it. A
main argument for the fundamental assumption has been that non–decomposability
is only in our eyes, and not an intrinsic property of strongly nonlinear systems, and
scientific progress will provide us with the new mathematical techniques required
to deal with nonlinear, integrated systems. I will return to this problem in Section
4.
3 Reverse Engineering the Brain
3.1 The Column Concept
A guiding idea about the composition of the brain is the hypothesis of the columnar
organization of the cerebral cortex. This column concept was developed mainly by
3We must differentiate between the natural, complex system and its description using modeling
techniques from linear system theory or nonlinear mathematics.
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Hubel and Wiesel, Mountcastle and Szentha´gothai (e.g. [31, 32, 33]), and later on,
it was published in the influential paper “The basic uniformity in structure of the
neocortex” [34]. According to this hypothesis (which has been taken more or less
as fact by many experimental as well as theoretical neuroscientists), the neocortex
is composed of ‘building blocks’ (Fig. 3) of repetitive structures, the ‘columns’ or
‘canonical cortical circuits’, and it is characterized by a basic canonical pattern of
connectivity. In this scheme all cortical areas would perform identical or similar
computational operations with their inputs.
Figure 3: Hubel and Wiesel’s ‘ice cube’ model of visual cortical processing. The
diagram illustrates the idea that the cortex is composed of iterated modules each of
which comprises a complete set of superimposed feature-processing elements, in
this case for ocular dominance (indicated by L and R) and orientation selectivity
(here represented for angles from 0 to pi ) (after [28]).
3.2 Method of Reverse Engineering
Referring to and based on these works, several projects started recently, among
them the Blue Brain Project [29] and the SyNAPSE Project [30]. They are consid-
ered to be “attempts to reverse-engineer the mammalian brain, in order to under-
stand brain function and dysfunction through detailed simulations” [29] or, more
pompous, “to engineer the mind”[30].
Reverse engineering is the main method used in empirical research to integrate
the data derived from the different levels of the brain organization. Originally
a concept in engineering and computer science, reverse engineering involves as
first step a decompositional analysis, i.e. the detailed examination of a functional
system (functional analysis) and its dissecting at the physical level into component
parts (structural analysis), see Fig. (2). In a second step, the (re-) construction of
the original system is attempted by creating duplicates including computer models,
see below (Section 4). This method is usually not much discussed with respect to
its assumptions, conditions and range4 but see [7, 8, 9].
4Only recently, differences between proponents of reverse engineering on how it is appropriately
to be accomplished became public. The heads of the two reverse engineering projects mentioned,
Markram [29] and Modha [30], disputed publicly as to what granularity of the modeling is needed
to reach a valid simulation of the brain. Markram questioned the authenticity of Modha’s respective
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The central role in these projects play cortical microcircuits or columns. As
Maas and Markram [35] formulate, it is a “tempting hypothesis regarding the com-
putational role of cortical microcircuits ... that there exist genetically programmed
stereotypical microcircuits that compute certain basis function.” Their paper well
illustrates the modular approach fostered, e.g. by [5, 9, 36, 37]. Invoking the local-
ization concept, the tenet is that there exist fundamental correspondences among
the anatomical structure of neuronal networks, their functions, and the dynamic
patterning of their active states. Starting point is the ‘uniform cortex’ with the
cortical microcircuit or column as the structural component. The question for the
functional component is answered by assuming that there is a one-to-one relation-
ship between the structural and the functional component (see Section 2.2). To-
gether, the modularity hypothesis of the brain is considered to be both structurally
and functionally well justified.
As quoted above, the goal is to examine the hypothesis that there exist geneti-
cally programmed stereotypical microcircuits that compute certain basis function,
thus providing for complex cognitive capacities. This hypothesis is based on the
general, computational approach to cognitive capacities which takes for granted
that “cognition is computation”, i.e. the brain produces the cognitive capacities by
computing functions5.
This assumption allows to apply the idea of decomposition or reverse engineer-
ing in the following way. From mathematical analysis and approximation theory it
is well-known that a broad class of practically relevant functions f can be approx-
imated by composition or superposition of some basis functions. Of prime rele-
vance in this respect are Kolmogorov’s ‘superposition theorem’ stating that contin-
uous functions of n arguments can always be represented using a finite composition
of functions of a single argument, and addition, and Weierstrass and Stone’s clas-
sical result that any real continuous function can be approximated with arbitrary
precision using a finite number of computing units. Kolmogorov’s theorem was re-
discovered in the 1980s by Hecht-Nielsen and applied to artificial neural networks.
Since then many different types of function networks and their properties have been
investigated, so that a lot of results about the approximation properties of networks
are already available, see e.g. [38].
For example, neural networks for function approximation have been developed
based on orthogonal basis functions such as Fourier series, Bessel functions and
Legendre polynomials. A typical configuration of such neural network of feedfor-
ward type is illustrated in Fig. 4. The input is x¯ = (x1, ...,(xm) and the output is
f (x¯) = y¯ = (y1, ...,yk) with
y j = w1, j · f1(x¯)+w2, j · f2(x¯)+ ...+wn, j · fn(x¯) (7)
The functions fi(x¯)(i = 1, ...,n) are the basis functions computed by the net-
claims [6].
5See [1] for discussion of the computational approaches (including the neurocomputational one)
to brain function, and their shortcomings.
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Figure 4: Example of a network computing the function f (x¯) = y¯ = (y1, ...,yk).
work units. The real numbers wi, j (i = 1, ...,n; j = 1, ...,k) are their respective
weights which can be adapted using effective learning algorithms to approximate
the function f (x¯).
As one can see, eqn. 7 represents the analog of eqns. 3 and 5, now in the
computational realm. That is, from functional analysis and decomposition of a
cognitive capacity into subcapacities, and fractionation of the cortex (or some sub-
system) into parts we arrive at linear decomposition of a cognitive function into
elements of a given set of ‘simple’, or basis functions.
Thus, if some basis functions were identified, they provided the components
of a (possible) computational decomposition. The reverse engineering method as
applied in the cognitive and brain sciences from a computational perspective then
proceeds as follows:
Reverse engineering the cortex.
1. Capacity analysis: Specify a certain cognitive capacity which is assumed to
be produced through the cortex by computing a certain function.
2. Decompositional analysis:
(a) Functional (computational) analysis: Select a set of basis functions
which might serve as functional components or computational units
in the cortex.
(b) Structural analysis: Identify a set of anatomical components of the cor-
tex. Provide evidence that cortical microcircuits are the anatomical
components of the cortex.
3. Localization: Provide evidence for the functional components or computa-
tional units being linked with the anatomical components.
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4. Synthesis:
(a) Modeling:
i. Establish a structurally adequate functional model of the computa-
tional unit (the presumed ’canonical circuit’) which generates the
basis functions specified in step 2.(a).
ii. Build a structurally adequate network model of the cortex (or some
subsystem) composed of the canonical circuit models.
(b) Simulation: Prove that the specific cognitive capacity or function un-
der study is generated by the network of circuit models, i.e through
superposition of the specified basis functions.
3.3 Hypotheses and Reality
With the reverse engineering scheme formulated above, we have a ’recipe’ at hand
which could facilitate the analysis very much. Recent findings in the experimental
and theoretical fields, however, have objected most of the assumptions and hy-
potheses made as problematic, if not inappropriate and unrealistic. Already step 1,
specification of a cognitive capacity, poses serious problems. It has always been
extremely difficult to define exactly what is meant by a psychological, cognitive,
or mental term, and the possibility should be acknowledged that they are only
figments of our experimental designs or convenient artifices to organize our theo-
retical models [21]. This difficulty is obvious in recent attempts to build cognitive
ontologies (e.g. [20, 22].
Likewise, the assumptions about the structural and functional composition of
the cortex, the notion of the basic uniformity in the cortex with respect to the den-
sity and types of neurons per column for all species turned out to be untenable
(e.g. [39, 40, 41, 42]). It has been impossible to find the cortical microcircuit
that computes a specific basis function [43, 42]. No genetic mechanism has been
deciphered that designates how to construct a column. The column structures en-
countered in many species (but not in all) seem to represent spandrels (structures
that arise non-adaptively, i.e. as an epiphenomenon) in various stages of evolution
[44].
Step 4 - synthesis - is worth extended discussion which space limitations for-
bid. In short, this step represents the conviction that large-scale modeling of brain
networks will eventually lead to understanding the mind-brain problem. It has been
argued that producing and understanding complex phenomena from the interaction
of simple nonlinear elements like artificial neurons or cellular automata is possible.
One expects then, that this would also work for cortical circuits which are recog-
nized as nonlinear devices, and theories could be applied (or developed, if not yet
available) that would guide us to which model setup might have generated a given
network behavior. This would complete the reverse engineering process.
However, findings in complexity or nonlinear science exclude such transfer of
the usual, linear approach. It is now clear that finding out which processes caused a
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specific complex behavior of a given system - an inverse problem - is hard because
of its ill-posedness6 . This means for the study of cortical circuits and networks
of them that from observed activity or function we cannot, in principle, infer the
internal organization. A wide variety of different organizations can produce the
same behavior.
If we revisit the column concept of the cortex employed in theories of brain or-
ganization, we recognize that hypothesized structural components (cortical columns)
have been identified with alike hypothetical functional components (basis func-
tion), employing the localization concept (Section 2.2). As we have seen, the facts
contradict these assumptions, i.e. the reverse engineering project has been based
on false presuppositions. In contrast to the localization idea, there is evidence
for a given functional component to be implemented by spatially distributed net-
works and, vice versa, for a given structural component to implement more than
one distinct function. With other words, it is not feasible for specific functions to
be mapped to structurally bounded neuronal structures [20, 39, 40, 41].
This means, although the column concept is an attractive idea both from neu-
robiological and computational point of view, it cannot be used as an unifying
principle for understanding cortical function. Thus, it has been concluded that the
concept of the cortex as a ‘large network of identical units’ should be replaced
with the idea that the cortex consists of ‘large networks of diverse elements’ whose
cellular and synaptic diversity is important for computation (e.g. [42].
It is worth to notice that the claim for conceptual change towards ‘cortex as
large network of diverse elements’ completely remains within the framework of
reverse engineering, i.e. it is a plea for ‘Just carry on!’. It appears questionable,
however, that the original goals of the cognitive and brain sciences and AI can be
achieved this way. Actually, the methods of decompositional analysis and reverse
engineering themselves have been principally criticized, which will be shortly dis-
cussed in the next section.
4 The Modeling Relation
In Section 2.4, I concluded that complex, integrated systems are basically non-
decomposable, thus resisting the standard analysis method. Now I return to this
issue and to the consequences for investigating such systems in the cognitive and
brain sciences.
Despite contradicting findings in complex systems science, the majority of re-
searchers in the cognitive and brain sciences subscribes for the fundamental as-
sumption, i.e. the relevant systems in the cognitive and brain sciences are treated
as nearly decomposable. Accordingly, non-decomposability is considered not as
intrinsic property of complex, integrated systems but only as subjective, temporary
failure of our methodology, due to insufficient mathematical techniques (e.g. [45]).
6In mathematics, a problem is called ill-posed if no solution or more than one solution exists, or
if the solutions depend discontinuously upon the initial data.
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In contrast to that, Rosen [10, 11] has argued that understanding complex, in-
tegrated systems requires making the scientific analysis method itself a subject of
discussion. A powerful method of understanding and exploring the nature of the
scientific method, and in particular, reverse engineering, provides the modeling
relation. It is this relation by which scientists bring “entailment structures into
congruence” [10, p. 152]. The modeling relation is represented by the set of map-
pings shown in Fig. 5. It relates two systems, a natural system N and a formal
system F , by a set of arrows depicting processes or mappings. The assumption is
that this diagram represents the various processes which we are carrying out when
we perceive the world.
Figure 5: The modeling relation. A natural system N is modeled by a formal
system F . Each system has its own internal entailment structures (arrows a and c),
and the two systems are connected by the encoding and decoding processes (arrows
b and d). After [10, p.60].
The modeling relation is a relation in the formal mathematical sense,
R = {(a,c) | a = b◦ c◦d} (8)
while ◦ denotes concatenation. The members a and c of each ordered pair in
R are entailments from the two systems, N and F . Natural system N is part of the
physical world that we wish to understand (in our case: human being, organism,
brain), in which things happen according to rules of causality (arrow a). That is,
if some cause acts on N, then the system will behave in a certain way, or produce
certain effects. This resultant coupling of cause and effect in N is called causal
entailment.
On the right of Fig. 5, F represents symbolically the parts of the natural sys-
tem (observables) which we are interested in, along with formal rules of inference
(arrow c) that essentially constitute our working hypotheses about the way things
work in N, i.e. the way in which we manipulate the formal system to try to mimic
causal events observed or hypothesized in the natural system on the left. Stated
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another way, F has inferential linkage; that is, if some premise proposition acts on
F , then it will generate a consequential proposition as conclusion. This resultant
coupling of premise and conclusion in F is called inferential entailment.
Arrow b represents the encoding of the parts of N under study into the formal
system F , i.e. a mapping that establishes the correspondence between observables
of N and symbols defined in F . Predictions about the behavior in F , according
to F’s rules of inference, are compared to observables in N through a decoding
represented by arrow d. When the predictions match the observations on N, we
say that F is a successful model for N. Otherwise the entailment structures could
not be brought into congruence, thus F failed to model N.
It is important to note that the encoding and decoding mappings are indepen-
dent of the formal and natural systems, respectively. In other words, there is no
way to arrive at them from within the formal system or natural system. That is, the
act of modeling is really the act of relating two systems in a subjective way. That
relation is at the level of observables; specifically, observables which are selected
by the modeler as worthy of study or interest.
Given the modeling relation and the detailed structural correspondence be-
tween our percepts and the formal systems into which we encode them, it is pos-
sible to make a dichotomous classification of systems into those that are simple or
predicative and those that are complex or impredicative. This classification can
refer to formal inferential systems such as mathematics or logic, as well as to
physical systems. As Rosen showed [10, 11], a simple system is one that is de-
finable completely by algorithmic method: All the models of such a system are
Turing-computable or simulable. When a single dynamical description is capable
of successfully modeling a system, then the behaviors of that system will, by def-
inition, always be correctly predicted. Hence, such a system will be predicative in
the sense that there will exist no unexpected or unanticipated behavior.
A complex system is by exclusion not a member of the syntactic, algorith-
mic class of systems. Its main characteristics are as follows. A complex system
possesses non-computable models; it has inherent impredicative loops in it. This
means, it requires multiple partial dynamical descriptions - no one of which, or
combination of which, suffices to successfully describe the system. It is not a
purely syntactic system as described by eqns. (1) – (5) but it necessarily includes
semantic elements. Complex systems also differ from simple ones in that complex
systems cannot be linearly composed of parts - they are non-decomposable. This
means, when a complex system is decomposed, its essential nature is broken by
breaking its impredicative loops.
This has important effects. Decompositional analysis is inherently destructive
to what makes the system complex - such a system is not decomposable without
losing the essential nature of the complexity of the original system! In addition, by
being not decomposable, complex systems no longer have analysis and synthesis
as simple inverses of each other. Building a complex system is therefore not simply
the inverse of any analytic process of decomposition into parts, i.e. the system is
not a direct product of components, thus eqn. (5) does not hold.
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Since the brain is a complex, integrated and thus non-decomposable system,
both steps of reverse engineering – decomposition into functional and structural
components and subsequent synthesis – must necessarily fail and will not provide
the envisaged understanding!
It should be stressed that simple and complex systems after Rosen’s definition
cannot be directly related to those sensu Simon (Section 2). While Rosen’s ap-
proach yields a descriptive definition of complexity, Simon’s is interactional, see
[46]. It seems clear, however, that Rosen’s ‘simple systems’ comprise Simon’s
full- and near-decomposable systems, and Rosen’s ‘complex systems’ correspond
to Simon’s non-decomposable, integrated systems, as well as to Levin’s evolved
systems. No matter which definition is applied, the conclusion about the brain’s
non–decomposability remains valid.
5 Conclusions
If one attempts to understand a complex system like the brain it is of crucial impor-
tance if general operation principles can be formulated. Traditionally, approaches
to reveal such principles follow the line of decompositional analysis as expressed in
the fundamental assumption of cognitive and brain sciences, i.e. cognitive systems
like other, truly complex systems are decomposable. Correspondingly, reverse en-
gineering has been considered the appropriate methodology to understand the brain
and to engineer artificial cognitive systems.
I have argued that this position is at odds with the findings of complexity sci-
ence. In fact, non-decomposability is an intrinsic property of complex, integrated
systems, and cannot be considered as subjective, temporary failure of our method-
ology, due to insufficient mathematical techniques. Thus, the dominant complexity
concept of cognitive and brain sciences underlying reverse engineering needs re-
vision. The updated, revised concept must comprise results from the nonlinear
science of complexity and insights expressed, e.g., in Rosen’s work on life and
cognition. In the first line, this means that the fundamental assumption of cogni-
tive and brain sciences must be abandoned.
Organisms and brains are complex, integrated systems which are non–decomposable.
This insight implies that there is no ‘natural’ way to decompose the brain, neither
structurally nor functionally. We must face the uncomfortable insight that in cogni-
tive and brain sciences we have conceptually, theoretically, and empirically to deal
with complex, integrated systems which is much more difficult than with simple,
decomposable systems of quasi–independent modules! Thus, we cannot avoid (at
least in the long run) subjecting research goals such as the creation of ‘brain-like
intelligence’ and the like to analyses which apprehend the very nature of natural
complex systems.
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